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Abstract: This article explores the prominence of different types of sources in the coverage 
of the 2014 Scottish independence referendum on BBC Scotland’s regional news bulletin. It 
combines the most commonly used classifications of news sources in the literature and 
proposes an integrated taxonomy, in which official, unofficial, elite and non-elite sources may 
take on news shaper or news maker roles. This taxonomy is used to analyse the referendum 
coverage on BBC’s Reporting Scotland in the final month of the campaign. Findings suggest 
that, despite the presence of many different types of sources, male-dominated political elites 
were the main focus in the news. We argue that, although the inclusion of some grassroots 
and citizen sources is encouraging, the coverage more broadly manifests a liberal democratic 
logic whereby the media represent the views of politicians and political organisations to the 
public, whose role is to make an informed choice between them with comparatively limited 
opportunities to participate in the mediated political debate.  
Keywords: Media sources, independence referendum, television, Scotland.  
Introduction 
The 2014 Scottish independence referendum was arguably one of the biggest political 
events in Europe that year. Scottish voters were called to decide whether their nation would 
remain a part of the UK or become an independent country. Eventually 55% of the electorate 
decided that Scotland should stay in the UK, but the campaign will primarily be remembered 
for the unprecedented engagement of citizens in the process in terms of voting (84.6% of the 
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registered electorate voted, the highest turnout in any UK election or referendum), 
participating in grassroots politics and reversing a long-standing trend of political 
disengagement (Cramb, 2015). 
Much of this grassroots participation took place on social media, widely seen as 
having provided a platform for voices not normally heard on mainstream news. Despite this, 
mainstream ‘old’ media remained central in setting the parameters of the official political 
debate (Law, 2015) and television, in particular, maintained its position as the most used 
media platform in the UK. In 2014, 92% of UK adults reported watching television almost 
every day (Ofcom, 2015) and television remained the most used source for news (Reuters 
Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2015). Despite the gradual transformation of the media 
landscape, in the period we study ‘traditional media organisations continue to play a pivotal 
role in British politics’ (Chadwick and Stanyer, 2011, p. 216) as primary and credible sources 
of political information, co-creators of public discourse and the main way for social actors to 
reach a large audience. Therefore, the space they provide to different voices matters and 
raises fundamental questions about the nature of participation and representation in (or 
exclusion from) public democratic debate (Cottle, 2003). 
This article thus focuses its attention on television and the range of voices represented 
in its coverage of the Scottish independence referendum. More specifically, it looks at the 
coverage of the final month of the campaign on BBC Scotland’s early evening regional news 
bulletin (Reporting Scotland) and explores the access different types of news sources were 
given to the mediated debate. To analyse their presence in the news, our study proposes a 
taxonomy of sources, based on a combination and classification of the most commonly 
accepted typologies in the literature. The traditional categories of official sources (sources 
with recognized political, organisational or social function), unofficial sources (‘ordinary’ 
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people) and experts (knowledgeable individuals) are discussed in their roles as news shapers 
or news makers (Soley, 1992) and their status as elite or non-elite (Poler Kovačič, 2004b). 
This taxonomy is then used to analyse the coverage and findings are contextualised within 
normative democratic theory regarding how the media may promote democratic inclusion 
and deliberation. 
Definitions and taxonomy of sources 
News sources are individuals who contribute to media content by providing 
newsworthy information to journalists and, as such, they are an integral part of daily news 
production routines (Cameron et al., 1997; Laban, 2004). Gans (1979) defines them as ‘the 
actors whom journalists observe or interview, including interviewees who appear on the air 
or who are quoted […] in articles, and those who only supply background information or 
story suggestions’ (p.80). Johnson-Cartee (2005) labels them as ‘news promoters’, namely 
‘those individuals or groups, who draw attention to occurrences’ and promote them into 
‘public events’ (p.183). These conceptualizations cover a diversity of sources and ways of 
providing information to the media, yet our study only focuses on sources that overtly appear 
and/or are referenced in the news.  
Gans (1979) established an early typology of sources, differentiating between knowns 
(or already known individuals, such as politicians and government officials) and unknowns 
(or ‘ordinary’ people). At about the same time, Hall et al. (1978) talk of accredited sources, 
who become ‘primary definers’ in the news (they get the first say in how a news event is 
interpreted) because of the power accorded to them by their institutional position, their 
representative status (for elected politicians or representatives of interest groups) or their 
knowledge and expertise in a certain area. Journalists, according to the same account, prefer 
these sources because they carry institutional authority and are seen as providing ‘objective’ 
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or at least ‘authoritative’ statements, which journalists need in order to make their stories 
credible. As Davis (2003) suggests, ‘the “primary definer” role of official sources is 
“structurally determined” by the routine practices and values of journalism’ which favour 
sources with high social status (p.35), while in turn, their regular prominence in news 
accounts further reinforces their social status and power. ‘Secondary definers’, according to 
this account, do not usually enjoy this high status and have a complementary role in media 
reports.  
Other authors make similar distinctions between official (Gans’s knowns or Hall et 
al.’s accredited sources) and unofficial (Gans’s unknowns or ‘ordinary’ citizens) sources or 
elites and non-elites (Cottle, 1993; Fishman, 1980; Sigal, 1973). Like the distinction between 
‘primary’ and ‘secondary definers’, these categorisations share a focus on the power 
imbalance between official and non-official sources in accessing media space, but they do not 
account for differences within these groups (Manning, 2001, p.140). Not all official sources 
are equally powerful in getting their perspectives heard, there are often power struggles 
between official sources in defining an event, primary definitions may be dislodged by other 
definitions, and powerful sources may lose power over time (Anderson, 2003; Schlesinger, 
1990). Similarly, not all non-official sources face the same obstacles in securing media 
attention (Manning, 2001).  
The criticisms cited above challenge the correspondence implied in earlier accounts 
between primary definer and elite status. Indeed, depending on the situation, elite and non-
elite sources may function as either news makers or news shapers (Soley, 1992). News 
makers are individuals who represent a legitimate focus for the news, because they are 
protagonists in a newsworthy event or offer the media a story that satisfies their news values; 
whereas news shapers provide analytical and explanatory background for stories initiated by 
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others, help audiences to make sense of the news and lend detachment or legitimacy to 
stories, without being themselves the focus of the news. News shapers are secondary definers 
and their role is to help interpret the news. While the distinction between official and 
unofficial sources is a distinction between source categories, the distinction between news 
makers and news shapers is one between source functions. 
These different classifications and definitions of source categories have provided 
insightful ways to conceptualise the types of social groups that appear in or shape mediated 
debate, however using them interchangeably and/or in isolation from each other misses the 
analytical complexity their combination could offer and can lead to conceptual confusion. 
This study proposes an integrated taxonomy of news sources, which combines previous 
definitions and classifications into a single model (figure 1), thus allowing for their insights 
to be integrated and for finer distinctions to be made. This model forms the basis of our 
theoretical and empirical discussion and can potentially serve as a starting point for other 
studies analysing news sources.   
Towards an integrated taxonomy of news sources 
The taxonomy we propose brings together previous categories and functions in one 
consistent model (figure 1), allowing a clearer and more comprehensive understanding of the 
range of sources and their potential influence on traditional news media which, as explained 
earlier, are the focus of this paper. A mapping of the influence of these sources on digital 
media, which are not part of ‘old’ news organisations, falls outside the scope of this study. In 
our model, the elite and official status axes define four source categories: elite official, non-
elite official, experts and unofficial sources. These are ideal types and may exceptionally 
intertwine – however in most cases their membership is distinct. Newsmaker and news 
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shaper functions may be taken on by any category that can offer the media a newsworthy 
story, although, other things being equal, official status favours a newsmaker role.  
FIGURE 1 HERE 
At this stage, it is important to acknowledge that digital and social media, and 
particularly Twitter and Facebook, are becoming integral to journalistic practices and daily 
routines (Cision, 2015). Social media enable citizens, civil society, and political and business 
elites to bypass traditional media and directly communicate with their key publics and each 
other (Paulussen and Harder, 2014), but they have also became a newsgathering tool used in 
mainstream media reporting across different areas, including politics (Ahmad, 2010; 
Herminda, 2013).  However, social media do not form a single category in our taxonomy 
because this is not a source per se, but a channel of communication that may be used by any 
of the sources in the taxonomy. Therefore in our subsequent analysis we record references to 
new media sources (e.g. a quote from Twitter) under the different sources they correspond to 
(e.g. an ordinary viewer or a politician). These new media references were indeed very few – 
in the period we studied, only two news items on Reporting Scotland included five Twitter 
posts in their reporting (four from political sources and one from an ordinary viewer). 
Elite and non-elite official sources 
Official sources are sources determined by their position (Poler Kovačič, 2004a): 
elected or appointed public officials, politicians and corporations, representatives of 
governance institutions or authorities (political, economic, cultural, scientific, religious etc.), 
representatives of NGOs, societies, associations or civic initiatives. Official sources talk 
about news events in their capacity as an authorised representative of an organisation: for 
example, they may be high-ranking politicians or party communications professionals. 
Official sources may have elite or non-elite status: the former enjoy higher political, 
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economic or social power, legitimacy, credibility, social status and communications 
resources, giving them more potential to influence media content (Cottle, 2003; Johnson-
Cartee, 2005; Reese et al., 1994). The latter benefit from less public recognition and 
communications resources by comparison, however, their official status still grants them 
credibility. 
Elite official sources include political and state institutions, official political 
campaigns, corporate, business and economic organisations, major NGOs, as well as news 
agencies and other traditional media (radio, newspapers, etc.), from which journalists get 
information (Poler Kovačič, 2004a; 2004b; Shoemaker and Reese, 1996). These sources are 
situated at the top of the ‘hierarchy of credibility’ (Davis, 2003) - in most social systems 
people with higher rank and status are deemed more credible than people with lower rank and 
status. Journalists are, therefore, ‘inclined to respect a certain source hierarchy in which they 
ascribe more credibility to elite official sources, such as known experts and representatives of 
political and business institutions, than to unofficial sources, such as ordinary citizens’ 
(Paulussen and Harder, 2014, p.543).  
Amongst elite official sources, political sources in particular represent the most used 
and influential sources in the media (Davis, 2003; 2010). The attention and privileged access 
they enjoy is due both to their elite status and power in society (Gans, 1979; Hall et al., 1978; 
Johnson-Cartee, 2005), but also to the public relations professionals they employ to develop 
sophisticated strategies to get their messages in the news (Moloney, 2000; McNair, 2011). 
These professional communicators have established an exchange relationship between 
political actors and the media where the former provide the latter with information they need 
to attract audiences, in exchange for visibility and coverage (Quinn, 2012). Media 
dependence on these ‘information subsidies’ is encouraged by the dominance of the market 
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model in journalism, whereby news organisations seek to remain profitable by having a 
decreasing number of journalists produce an increasing amount of content (McNair, 2011; 
Lewis et al., 2008), allowing elite political sources to ‘clearly set, frame and build 
considerable portions of the agenda’ (Sallot and Johnson, 2006a, p.152). 
Non-elite official sources, including smaller non-profit and non-governmental 
organisations (charities, voluntary organisations, associations, societies, unions, 
communities), interest, activist and pressure groups (Davis, 2003; Deacon, 2003) as well as 
small businesses, enjoy lower status of legitimacy, trustworthiness and credibility than their 
elite counterparts, which is also reflected in their lower visibility and presence in media 
discourse (Johnson-Cartee, 2005). However, these non-elites are increasingly challenging the 
‘hierarchy of credibility’ by becoming a legitimate and authoritative source in the news, often 
with the help of professional communicators (Davis, 2003). As Sallot and Johnson (2006b) 
emphasise, ‘many non-profit organisations would not get coverage for their services if it were 
not for [public relations] practitioners contacting media and writing impressive and 
persuasive pitches’ (p.84). For non-elite official sources though, this task of securing media 
space is perhaps more difficult, since journalists do not always actively seek out their 
perspectives as they do with elites (Anderson, 2003).  
The dominance of elite official sources in media discourse led to several studies 
treating them simply as ‘official sources’ (Davis, 2003) and considering non-elite official 
sources as unofficial sources instead (Anderson, 2003). Non-elite official sources, however, 
still represent sources according to their position, who speak on behalf of their organisation 
and thus differ significantly from unofficial sources (Anderson, 2003; Poler Kovačič, 2004b). 
As discussed, both elite and non-elite official sources are highly likely to use professional 
communications techniques to secure and manage their presence in the media and this places 
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them in an advantageous position to become news makers because they actively engage in 
promoting stories in the news (although success is neither guaranteed nor exclusive to official 
sources).  
Experts 
Although many authors place experts in the same category as official sources, others 
argue that they should be classified separately, as expertise makes their contribution 
distinctive (Boyce, 2006). Experts do not represent the views of institutions, like official 
sources do, yet they enjoy elite status in today’s knowledge societies. Experts include 
academics and scientists, noted observers and scholars, knowledgeable individuals, former 
government representatives, politicians and other actors, who have specialist knowledge 
about social and political issues (Johnson-Cartee, 2005). It is this knowledge that gives them 
elite status and legitimates their position as analysts of the meaning of news events (Boyce, 
2006). In addition to their knowledge, experts’ media access also depends on their skills in 
working with the media and their relationships with actors within political communities (Pan 
and Kosicki, 2001; Reese et al., 1994). Even though they can be supporters of a political 
cause or former official sources, experts often appear as neutral sources, giving ‘objective’ 
and ‘impartial’ analysis of a situation (Boyce, 2006; Shoemaker and Reese, 1996).  
Unofficial sources  
Unofficial sources are not sources with authority, elite status, position or expertise, 
but rather ordinary people, participants or eyewitnesses in events. The credibility and 
legitimacy of their voices in the news mostly originate from their involvement in events, 
personal experience and/or a possibility to influence results of opinion polls, elections or 
referenda (Pan and Kosicki, 2001; Poler Kovačič, 2004a; 2004b). Laban (2004, p.213) 
conceptualises them as actors, who appear in the news as ‘individuals’ with their own views 
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and interpretations. Based on Gans’s (1979) five categories of unknowns, Shoemaker and 
Reese (1996) distinguish between protesters, rioters, strikers; victims; violators of the laws 
and mores; voters, survey respondents and other aggregates; and participants in unusual 
activities. Especially when they are not part of organised groups, these sources lack power, 
cultural and communication capital, and are less well placed than official sources to become 
news makers, or leading actors in the news, except in cases when they become involved in an 
extraordinary event, in deviant or violent behaviour (van Dijk, 1995).  
Lewis et al. (2005) offer an extensive analysis of the conditions in which ordinary 
citizens appear in mainstream news: they are either interviewed directly (vox populi) or 
included in more indirect ways, e.g. in reports of opinion polls, yet most commonly they are 
represented through unsubstantiated inferences about what they think or say. This also 
applies when journalists reference social media contributions by citizens in their reports. 
Paulussen and Harder (2014) observe that references to unknown people’s contributions on 
social media are mostly made in collective and anonymous terms, as a way to represent the 
voice of the public. Their perspectives are, therefore, more often talked about by journalists 
than voiced by themselves directly, at least in traditional media which are the focus of this 
paper.  
Although there are exceptions to this construction of ordinary citizens (for example 
when they are part of protest and citizen movements), these representations tend to be 
relatively few (Lewis et al., 2005). Literature on social movements suggests that they face 
considerable challenges in overcoming the power differential that privileges elite access to 
public debate and ‘mainstream news media’s preference for “official sources”’ (Medearis, 
2005, p.59). This means that in order to have their perspectives heard, they mainly have to 
resort to disruptive acts of ‘coercion’ (Medearis, 2005), creating a crisis through civil 
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disobedience, marches, boycotts or strikes. Even then, social movements often struggle with 
‘the conventions and practices of journalism […] amplifying both violence and 
sensationalism’ (McCurdy, 2012, p.250), rather than the substance of what they have to say. 
Although official sources do not get guaranteed media attention either, unofficial sources face 
additional challenges.  
L'Etang (2004) critically observes that increasing dominance of public relations 
techniques in the public sphere further reduces the communication space for ordinary citizens 
to express their views and concerns in mainstream media. Clearly this is not the case on 
social media, which are gradually altering the landscape, diminishing the former monopoly of 
‘old’ news organisations and allowing ordinary citizens a more active role in ‘redesigning’ 
politics (Chadwick and Stanyer, 2011). However, mainstream media, particularly television, 
remained a significant locus of public debate during the referendum studied here (Ofcom, 
2015; Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 2015). In a ‘hybridised’ system of old 
and new media, old media still command considerable power, large audiences and financial 
resources (Chadwick and Stanyer, 2011). Therefore, the amount of space they provide to 
different sources to express their views has direct implications for democratic participation in 
mediated public debate (Cottle, 2003). 
Using our integrated typology discussed above, the research question we seek to 
address in this article is which of these types of sources were most prominent and whose 
voices were heard less in BBC Scotland’s news coverage of the independence referendum. In 
what follows, we first provide a very brief background on the Scottish referendum campaign 
before moving to discuss our methodological approach to our research question. 
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The Scottish independence referendum and the campaigns 
The Scottish independence referendum took place on 18 September 2014. The 
discussions about it in the media started much earlier though, with the Scottish National 
Party’s (SNP) victory in the 2011 Scottish Election (Carrell, 2011). The referendum was a 
historic moment for Scotland, which had been part of the United Kingdom for more than 
three centuries, and the first time that the electorate was given the opportunity to decide on 
the existence of the British union. It was also a historic moment for the SNP, which in the 
previous years had become the most popular Scottish party. Although it has been suggested 
that the reasons for its rise, at least until its second electoral victory in 2011, were more in its 
perceived competence in administration and leadership than in public support for 
independence (Devine, 2016), its landslide win in 2011 meant that its cause of holding an 
independence referendum could materialise.  
Yes Scotland, the campaign supporting independence, was launched in May 2012 and 
Better Together, which supported staying in the UK, just a month later. This referendum 
campaign was arguably one of the longest political campaigns in the UK. Better Together 
involved the three biggest UK parties with branches in Scotland: Labour, the Conservatives 
and the Liberal Democrats. All three had been in government in Westminster or in Scotland, 
alone or in coalitions, in the past. Although they agreed on their stance against Scottish 
independence, there were still underlying political differences between the three parties, 
which represented different positions in the political spectrum and remained opponents 
contesting for government in London and Scotland. There was, therefore, a perceived need 
among both broadcasters and the parties themselves to have balance between their individual 
perspectives.  
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Yes Scotland included the SNP, the Scottish Green Party and the Scottish Socialist 
Party – with the SNP being the biggest party in that campaign and the only one that had ever 
been in government. In addition to the official campaigns, grassroots groups formed during 
the campaign (e.g. Women for Independence, Working for Scotland) and they organised 
parallel communication activities, including public meetings and online media, which 
mobilised the public and ignited debate.  
The two campaigns invested heavily in communications resources. In interviews with 
Dekavalla, political communicators from both sides revealed that, in the last months before 
the vote, 6-8 people were working in media relations on each side. Apart from the ‘umbrella’ 
campaigns, the political parties participating in each campaign also had their own media 
relations strategies. Communication teams were in regular contact with broadcasters, 
providing information, organising events for them to cover, arranging for their 
representatives to appear in interviews and debates, and alerting channels to public 
appearances of their leading figures.  
The same interviews suggested that, in addition to the media campaign, the strategy of 
the Yes side was to involve ordinary citizens and local communities from the early stages. 
This meant asking those who supported independence to persuade others in their 
communities, their workplace and social circle, and to mobilise support at grassroots level 
through local groups and public meetings. This is because strategists in the Yes campaign felt 
that people are more likely to be persuaded by people they know, rather than by mainstream 
media or politicians, who, according to them, had lost public trust. As a result, part of their 
media strategy was to have non-politicians speaking for the campaign on television as often 
as possible. 
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Civil society organisations were mostly neutral in the campaign. This is in contrast to 
the 1997 Scottish devolution referendum, where Scottish civil society ‘was crucial in leading 
the […] campaign for home rule’ (Paterson and Wyn Jones, 1999, p.193). In interviews with 
Dekavalla, representatives of civil society organisations suggested that they saw their role in 
the campaign as drawing attention to issues like democratic participation, poverty, welfare, 
local democracy, which might otherwise not have been key in the debate. In order to promote 
these issues, they organised events and public meetings, run websites and blogs, sent out 
press releases, and were occasionally interviewed by the media. They felt that their efforts 
were successful in attracting media attention, but they also thought that they were not seen as, 
neither intended to become, central participants in the debate. In their view, the media debate 
was more open to politicians and those who would give a straightforward answer to the 
binary question of the referendum, rather than to neutral organisations who would not 
provide direct answers. 
Broadcasting regulations in the UK do not allow television to take political sides and 
both public service and commercial broadcasters are obliged to provide due impartiality and 
equal space to different political perspectives (McNair, 2009). Newspapers are allowed to 
openly express political allegiances, however, only one newspaper in Scotland (Sunday 
Herald) positioned itself in favour of independence. The others, including indigenous titles 
and Scottish editions of English papers, were ambivalent or outright against independence. 
 
Method 
In order to establish which sources were present in the news coverage of BBC 
Scotland, we conducted a source analysis (cf. Reese et al., 1994) of the channel’s regional 
news bulletin Reporting Scotland, which was the most watched daily news programme in 
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Scotland (BBC Scotland Management Review, 2013/2014), during the final month of the 
campaign. By contrast to the UK-wide bulletin BBC News at Six, Reporting Scotland is 
produced specifically for a Scottish audience, who would be voting in the referendum. The 
final month represents a significant period, when coverage is expected to peak (de Vreese and 
Semetko, 2002). With the date of the vote approaching, undecided voters have to reach a 
decision and the media need to provide information to support the electorate in this process.  
Between 18 August and 18 September 2014, Reporting Scotland broadcast 123 news 
stories about the referendum. Each news story represented a unit of analysis and for each we 
recorded basic information, such as title, date of broadcast, position in the news programme, 
and the number of sources featured. These were further coded against a 10-item coding 
frame:  in the first instance, name and affiliation of the sources (if identified) were recorded 
and the sources were assigned into categorises and subcategories as identified in our 
integrated taxonomy presented earlier. We measured the frequency of sources’ appearance 
and the amount of airtime dedicated to their views, and recorded how each was included 
(paraphrased by journalists, through a statement in front of the camera, or a longer interview 
with a journalist), which side of the independence argument their statement favoured (Yes, 
No or neutral/unidentifiable position), their gender (male, female or unidentified) and the 
patterns in which they were used within the story (identified openly or reported generically; 
used just once or re-used; presented as responding to others or providing new arguments). 
The data were analysed with SPSS. We used descriptive statistics and tested statistical 
significance and strength of associations with Pearson’s Chi-square test and Phi/Cramer’s V 
coefficient between nominal variables, and t-test and one-way ANOVA between scale and 
nominal variables.   
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Findings and discussion 
The 123 stories we analysed were a total of 14 hours and 8 minutes long, and featured 
722 sources, who were given just over 5 hours and 16 minutes in total, with 26 seconds 
average airtime per source. Each story featured on average 5.9 different sources. Almost half 
of the sources were paraphrased (48.8%), which means they had the lowest level of control 
over how their words were represented. 41.7% of sources made brief statements on camera, 
while 9.6% appeared in longer interviews with a reporter. This allowed them the highest level 
of control/influence over their representation because, even though they may not have had 
control over the questions they were asked, their statements appeared in the context in which 
they were made, rather than contextualised by a journalist or edited into the news piece. The 
average level of influence (with values 1-paraphrasing, 2-camera statement, 3-interview) was 
1.6.  
The dominance of elite official sources 
As would be expected from our earlier discussion, elite official sources were by far 
the most prominent type of source in the coverage. More than half (60.5%) of all the sources 
we identified belong to this category (Table 1 and Figure 2), occupying 71.2% of the total 
airtime given to all sources (with average μ = 31 seconds per source) (Figure 3). This trend, 
as discussed in more detail in previous sections, has been previously attributed to a range of 
factors, from journalistic routines that see official elite sources as more credible (Cottle, 
2003; Hall et al., 1978; Reese et al., 1994) to the increased professionalisation of public 
relations and its extensive penetration in most elite organisations and particularly in political 
parties and campaigns (Froehlich and Rüdiger, 2006; McNair, 2011; Quinn, 2012). Indeed, 
the great majority of the elite sources we found were representatives of the official Yes and 
No campaigns and of the political parties, as well as the Scottish and UK Governments. 
Political sources amounted to 77.6% of elite official sources and almost half (47.0%) of all 
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the sources we identified. Business sources accounted for 14.4% of elite sources, while other 
subcategories (media, celebrities and prominent figures) had marginal presence. Although 
elite officials dominated the coverage in terms of both frequency and airtime, they were not 
allowed the most control in how their views were represented: more than half (57.2%) of 
them were paraphrased, followed by just over one third (35.5%) making single camera 
statements and a small proportion of longer interviews (7.3%) with a mean influence slightly 
below the average (μ = 1.5).  
The second most prominent category of sources in the coverage was unofficial 
sources, which made up 19.8% of the total number of sources (table 1, figure 2). Despite their 
non-elite status, unofficial sources claimed a significant presence in the Reporting Scotland 
coverage. This, however, did not entail equal media space to voice their views as they had 
only 8.5% of the total airtime (with significantly lower average than other categories at μ = 
11 seconds) given to sources, significantly less than elite and slightly less than non-elite 
official sources (Figure 3). The vast majority of unofficial sources (79.7%) were ordinary 
citizens, who in more than two thirds of cases appeared in front of the camera giving an 
individual statement or were interviewed by a reporter. The second most common way of 
representing citizens’ views was through public opinion polls (12.6% of unofficial sources), 
while other categories had marginal presence. Although the time they were given was 
relatively short, unofficial sources were allowed to represent their views in their own words 
(μ = 1.8), more often than elite official sources. This to an extent contradicts suggestions that 
ordinary citizens’ views are more often talked about by journalists than voiced by themselves 
in the media (Lewis et al., 2005; Paulussen and Harder, 2014). However, in this case, the role 
of ordinary citizens in referendum news was primarily to lend authenticity to reports in their 
function as voters, and perhaps for this reason they were shown speaking on camera more 
often.  
  18  
Non-elite official sources were the third most prominent category (9.8% of sources) in 
terms of frequency (table 1, figure 2) and second most prominent in terms of airtime (11.3%; 
average μ = 30 seconds per source) (figure 3). Grassroots campaigners and organisations 
were the most dominant group among them (64.8% of non-elite official sources), followed by 
small businesses (18.3%) and non-profit organisations (9.9%). Similarly to unofficial 
sources, non-elite officials had relatively high control over how their views were presented (μ 
= 1.9). Despite their relative success in getting coverage, non-elite officials did not challenge 
the ‘hierarchy of credibility’ as much as would be expected considering the high involvement 
of grassroots campaigns in the referendum: their non-elite status still meant that they were 
significantly less represented in the news than their elite counterparts.  
Elite status in this case was reinforced by the designation of the lead campaign groups 
representing the two sides of the argument by the Electoral Commission: although many 
groups officially campaigned for and against independence, Yes Scotland and Better Together 
were selected through a formal process as the head campaigns (Electoral Commission, 2014). 
Both these campaigns were made up of actors who were already elite – major political 
parties, senior politicians and prominent public figures. The Electoral Commission’s ‘stamp’ 
lent them additional elite status, credibility, and even more media attention, which grassroots 
groups did not enjoy to the same degree. 
Experts were somewhat surprisingly the least frequently used type of source in our 
taxonomy (5.7% of all sources with 6.8% of airtime, yet had the highest average time to 
express their views μ = 32 seconds). In most cases they appeared in front of the camera 
themselves (μ = 1.9) rather than were paraphrased. In more than two thirds of cases, experts 
were academics, followed by specialists/analysts/observers and former elite officials.  
TABLE 1 HERE 
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In general, the more elite the source, the more airtime was allocated to them 
(association between source category and average airtime was statistically significant, p = 
0.004). This was not the case though with the control they were allowed over the presentation 
of their views, with elite officials shown speaking on camera less than other categories. 
A very small proportion of sources we identified (1.8%) were unnamed or 
confidential (table 1, figure 2). Their identity was concealed with generalizations, such as 
‘according to well informed sources’, ‘it is believed’, etc. Any social actor can act as a 
confidential source and, although their anonymity obscures their ideological position, goals 
and motives, these ‘faceless’ sources are an essential part of news production and a 
precondition for the free flow of information in modern democracies (Johnson-Cartee, 2005).  
FIGURE 2 HERE 
FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
It has often been argued (Gamson, 2001; Lewis et al., 2005) that in order to promote a 
more active citizenry and more participation of the public in common affairs, the media need 
to include ordinary citizen voices talking about matters of public concern. Our findings 
suggest that non-elite sources had noticeable presence in the news coverage of the Scottish 
referendum. Taken together, non-elite sources accounted for 29.6% of all sources, occupied 
19.8% of airtime, and tended to present their views in their own words more often than elite 
officials, which is more than would be expected based on research in other contexts (Bennett 
et al., 2004; Feree et al., 2002). In the case of the Scottish referendum though, this is 
consistent with the high level of involvement and engagement of the public and grassroots 
groups with the political process (Cramb, 2015), which seems to be reflected in the BBC’s 
account. Even so, elite sources were more than twice as prominent (66.2% of the sources) 
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and were given almost four times more airtime (78.1%), suggesting that no matter how 
involved non-elites were in the political process, elites (and especially politicians) remained 
dominant by comparison. As will be discussed later in the article, this dominance of elites in 
political coverage is widely seen as contributing to the reproduction of a liberal perception of 
politics as the domain of politicians (Feree et al., 2002; Lewis et al., 2005) and is consistent 
with findings from previous studies of political coverage in Scottish media (Crawford, 2009; 
Dekavalla, 2012). 
Balance between Yes and No sources 
Balance between the perspectives of sources supporting the two sides of the 
referendum argument seemed to be a significant consideration. We found 37.3% of all 
sources favouring a Yes vote and 37.5% for a No vote, while the remaining quarter were 
neutral (Figure 4). Broadcasting regulations require television news to provide due 
impartiality (McNair, 2009), which has traditionally been interpreted by broadcasters as an 
opportunity for all participants to express their viewpoints. Understood in this sensei, it is 
clear that the news programme we examined adhered to these requirements in terms of 
frequency of appearance and (albeit slightly less) in terms of airtime given to each side. No 
sources received 42.1% of the time dedicated to all sources, while Yes received 40.4%, with 
the rest of the time devoted to neutral sources.  
FIGURE 4 
With just a quarter of all sources being neutral, the findings here confirm the 
suggestion made by civil society actors, and discussed earlier in this article, that the media 
debate during the referendum was more open to sources who would clearly position 
themselves with one of the two sides, rather than those who did not provide a straightforward 
answer to the referendum question. The binary character of the referendum is very likely to 
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have played a role in this, as the electorate had to choose between only two options. On the 
other hand, there have also been suggestions that Western media are becoming increasingly 
polarized in their coverage of politics more broadly and there is a general underrepresentation 
of moderate voices (McCluskey and Kim, 2012). 
Turning to the types of sources that supported each side (Figure 5), we found a 
statistically significant association (p = 0.000; φc = 0.21) between source category and 
advocated side. The No side had more elite official sources endorsing it (45.8% for No, 
37.1% for Yes), particularly elite businesses (57.1% for No, 19.0% for Yes). The only elite 
sources that advocated Yes more often than No were celebrities. The Yes side, on the other 
hand, had significantly higher support from non-elite sources: non-elite official (47.9% for 
Yes, 31.0% for No) and unofficial sources (35.7% for Yes, 20.3% for No) were largely in 
favour of independence. This is in line with the campaigning strategies of the two sides; as 
discussed in a previous section, interviews with Dekavalla suggested that the Yes campaign 
made a decision to be represented by non-politicians in media debates, when possible.  
Experts, on the other hand, most often appeared as neutral (43.9%), as would be 
expected from their role as knowledgeable analysts of news events. Another category with a 
high percentage of neutral sources was unofficial sources (44.1%), perhaps reflecting the 
indecisiveness of voters until the end of the campaign and the close results of opinion polls.  
FIGURE 5 HERE 
 
A male-dominated debate 
The study found great inequality in terms of gender representation. Men were almost 
three times as prominent as women (42.2% of all sources versus 16.6%), while in 41.1% of 
cases the gender of the source could not be determined due to generic references. If we 
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exclude these generic sources, men represented over 71.8% of sources (with 80.1% of 
airtime) and women 28.2% of sources (19.9% of airtime); the difference in airtime between 
the two genders was statistically significant (p = 0.004). Male sources dominated every 
category, apart from non-elite official sources, where men and women were equally 
represented. Elite sources (both officials and experts) were particularly male-dominated, with 
men over four times more commonly used than women, an association that we found to be 
strongly statistically significant (p = 0.000; φ = 0.31).  
The finding that men are used as news sources more than women is not unique to our 
study. A range of studies in different countries and contexts, including in the UK (Ross et al., 
2013; Sreberny and Van Zoonen, 2000), have found that women are less likely than men to 
be used as news sources (see Baitinger, 2015 for a review) which has been attributed both to 
the gendered nature of journalism and to the underrepresentation of women ‘in the positions 
and professions that produce newsworthy guests’ (Baitinger, 2015, p. 580). Indeed politicians 
and experts tend to be male-dominated social groups, but even so, women remain 
underrepresented in the news relative to their actual numbers in these professions (Ross et al., 
2013). In the news coverage studied here, women seem underrepresented even among 
ordinary citizens (although to a lesser extent than within other categories) – our unofficial 
sources category included 54.8% men and 45.2% women. Within the wider context of several 
studies finding a similar ‘gender bias’ in news coverage, this has significant implications for 
questions of democratic gender representation in the media (Ross et al., 2013).  
Men were more often No (43.0%) than Yes supporters (36.1%), while women were 
more often for Yes (38.3%) rather than No (31.7%). Women also appeared neutral more 
often (30%) than men (21%). The association between gender and side is not statistically 
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significant (p = 0.054) though. Taking gender, category and side into account (Table 2), by 
far the most utilised sources were male elites advocating a No position.  
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
A polarised debate between political elites 
In order to measure the degree of dialogue between different types of sources, we 
recorded whether each source was presented as responding to something said by others or 
introducing a new argument. We found that there was very little dialogue between sources, or 
engagement with what each other had to say: 69.9% of all sources introduced new arguments 
but did not respond to anyone else’s. This finding confirms previous research in Scotland and 
elsewhere that has found little deliberation and engagement between actors in the news 
(Crawford, 2009; Feree et al., 2002). This is significant because engagement with opponent 
arguments is a key requirement for a well-functioning public sphere (Bennett et al., 2004) – 
when sources just present their own views but fail to address each other’s perspectives, they 
do not facilitate democratic deliberation. Although the tendency not to respond to others’ 
arguments was consistent across categories, the highest level of engagement and dialogue 
was found among elite sources (38.0% of elite officials and 34.1% of experts responded to 
previously expressed views). Non-elite official and unofficial sources were the least involved 
in responding to others (both just under 15%). This association was statistically significant (p 
= 0.000; φ = 0.23), lending support to the argument that different social strata are rarely 
presented as engaging in dialogue with each other in news reports (Bennett et al., 2004).  
Yes and No sources were far more likely to engage in dialogue than neutral sources. 
While one third of Yes and No sources responded to already expressed views (usually 
coming from the other side), neutral sources in their majority (86.3%) introduced new views 
with this difference being statistically significant (p = 0.000; φ= 0.21). The discussion was, 
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therefore, polarised between the Yes and No sides, while neutral sources appeared as an 
additional voice, detached from the conversation.  
Conclusion 
In mass democracies where face-to-face deliberation among all their members is not 
practically possible, the media represent the main platforms for opinion formation and 
decision making through public discussion and argumentation (Elster, 1998). As suggested 
earlier, although digital platforms challenge the monopoly of mainstream media in this 
respect, the latter still maintain a central role in this process. Who is represented, who is 
absent, whose voices predominate and whose are marginal in mainstream media debate 
therefore remain fundamental concerns in democratic theory and public debate alike (Cottle, 
2003). The taxonomy of media sources we have proposed in this article allows a more 
nuanced account of who acts as a source in the news by integrating previous categorisations 
while distinguishing between types of sources that other taxonomies often classify together 
(for instance, elite versus non-elite official; non-elite official versus unofficial; elite official 
versus experts). 
In our analysis of the coverage of the 2014 Scottish referendum, specifically, the 
taxonomy highlighted differences between elite and non-elite official sources in their level of 
access to the debate, with the former clearly dominating news reports and the latter lagging 
behind even unofficial sources. By contrast we found that, despite being elite, experts did not 
have a very prominent position in the coverage. Our analysis, therefore, suggests that the 
relationship between the status of a source category as elite or official and the frequency with 
which this type of source appears in the news is not always straightforward.  
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Even though the case studied here generally confirmed the well-established 
journalistic preference for ‘credible’ elite institutional sources over ordinary citizens, the 
latter appeared more often than non-elite official organisations or experts, and lent the 
coverage the ‘authenticity’ of their voices. This authenticity was important when reporting on 
a political event that generated so much engagement among the electorate, and it might 
potentially have helped to generate more. Lewis et al. (2005) argue that the media can 
contribute to an engaged citizenry by providing audiences with examples of engaged citizens 
in their coverage. In our study, Reporting Scotland did provide several examples of voters 
discussing the referendum in their own voice, although the length of time they were offered 
to speak was less than that given to more elite and official sources. 
In general, whether a source category was elite or non-elite seemed to have a more 
straightforward relationship with the amount of airtime its members enjoyed, rather than with 
frequency of inclusion. Our findings suggest that elite sources consistently got more airtime 
than non-elite sources. This distinction between the amount of airtime and frequency of 
appearance of elite/non-elite and official/unofficial sources in the news is worth further 
investigation in research on other types of news events.  
Reporting Scotland provided equal space for both the Yes and No sides to express 
their views. The composition of sources speaking for the two sides was different though: non-
elite official, unofficial and expert sources, in this order, were more likely to advocate a Yes 
position, while the No side had notably higher support amongst elite official sources.  
Overall, our finding that elite official sources, particularly male politicians, were the 
most dominant sources overall in terms of frequency and airtime, agrees with trends 
established in the literature for several decades: elite political sources are the key news 
makers in major political events and men are far more prominent than women. The 
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prominence of elite politicians in the mediated debate is consistent with liberal democratic 
ideals. These suggest that the role of citizens in democracy is to elect their preferred 
representatives to deal with public issues and the role of the media is to represent the views of 
politicians to the public, so that they can make an informed choice between what they 
propose (Hackett, 2005; Feree et al., 2002).  
However, the unprecedented engagement of ordinary citizens and grassroots 
campaign groups in the democratic process made the Scottish independence referendum 
distinctive from other referenda and elections in the UK (Law, 2015). It also offered a rare 
opportunity for a mediated construction of citizenry as envisaged by participatory democratic 
theorists who argue that citizen empowerment and participation in public affairs can be 
‘learnt’ by seeing examples of such engagement in the news (Gamson, 2001; Lewis et al., 
2005). This opportunity was taken only to a certain extent by the news programme we 
studied.  
As Parkinson (2005, p.178) suggests, ‘in order to get their story told rather than 
someone else’s, [sources] must jockey hard for the media’s attention, largely on the basis of 
news values and salience to organizationally significant audiences’. Traditional media in 
Scotland and in the UK operate according to a liberal system (Hallin and Mancini, 2004) and 
a liberalist view of politics as ‘intra-elite debate’ (Hackett, 2005, p.86) with an overall 
tendency to privilege men (Ross et al., 2013) appears to be ingrained in both news values and 
newsgathering routines. Although there is space, especially during such an inclusive and 
engaging political event as was the Scottish referendum, for ordinary citizens and grassroots 
groups to challenge the established ‘hierarchy of credibility’, overturning the principle that 
sees politics as the job of politicians and men remains a difficult task. 
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i During the campaign the BBC was accused by Yes supporters of bias on different 
grounds, but a discussion of definitions of bias is beyond the scope of this article. In 
terms of sources’ access to mediated space, which is the focus of our analysis here, the 
data we studied show equal distribution of Yes and No sources.  
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Figure 1. Taxonomy model of news sources 
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Table 1. Frequency of categories and subcategories of sources in Reporting Scotland  
Source N % within category % overall 
Elite official 437 100 60.5 
Politics 339 77.6 47.0 
Business 63 14.4 8.7 
Media 13 3.0 1.8 
Celebrity 20 4.6 2.8 
Other 2 0.5 0.3 
Non-elite official 71 100 9.8 
Campaigners, activists, movements 46 64.8 6.4 
Small business 13 18.3 1.8 
Unions  5 7.0 0.7 
Non-profit 7 9.9 1.0 
Expert 41 100 5.7 
Academic 28 68.3 3.9 
Specialist 7 17.1 1.0 
Ex-officio 4 9.8 0.6 
Other  2 4.9 0.3 
Unofficial 143 100 19.8 
Vox populi 114 79.7 15.8 
Polls 18 12.6 2.5 
Protesters 5 3.5 0.7 
Participants 6 4.2 0.8 
Confidential 13 100 1.8 
Unaccounted 17 100 2.4 
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Figure 2. Different types of sources used in Reporting Scotland (%) 
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Figure 3. Airtime allocated to different types of sources (%) 
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Figure 4. Yes, No and neutral sources represented in Reporting Scotland (%) 
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Figure 5. Source categories and sides taken in the referendum debate (%)
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Table 2. Sources (N) according to category, gender and side 
 Yes No Neutral Total 
  Male Female Male Female Male Female  
Elite official 66 22 104 9 26 11 238 
Expert 9 1 8 2 10 3 33 
Non-elite official 12 12 7 11 6 2 50 
Unofficial  23 11 12 16 22 20 104 
Total 110 46 131 38 64 36 425* 
*297 sources (41.1%), whose gender could not be determined due to anonymous and/or generic references in 
the news items are excluded from this count.  
 
